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Sparked debate over causes of  the decline: trade v. 
automation. In this talk:              
• Discuss misunderstanding & misrepresentation of  mfg data
• Review research evidence on trade v. automation debate
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Precipitous and unprecedented decline in U.S. 
manufacturing employment in 2000s
Decline in manufacturing 
output & employment 
shares especially 
prevalent since 1970s, 
track each other.  
But, manufacturing real 
output growth kept pace 
with aggregate output 
growth in economy 0
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Real GDP: Private Industry and Manufacturing, 
1977=100
Private industries Manufacturing
 How to reconcile two pictures—Prevailing view:
o Prices of domestic manufactured goods falling relative to 
domestic services prices
o Productivity growth much higher in manufacturing
o Consumer demand for manufactured products limited
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Real GDP: Manfacturing and Private Industry; 
Manufacturing GDP and Employment Share
Private industries, real GDP Manufacturing, real GDP
Mfg GDP share Mfg employment share
Prevailing view: Rapid productivity growth explains the 
decline in manufacturing employment share
 Labor productivity defined as output (value added) per unit labor 
input (workers or hours).  It follows that:
em – ep = (ym – yp ) – (prdm – prdp)
Where e, y, and prd are employment, output, and labor productivity 
growth rates for manufacturing and the aggregate private sector. 
 If the output growth rates in manufacturing and the private sector 
are the same, then productivity accounts for ALL of the decline in 
manufacturing’s employment share.
o Not a causal relationship, but descriptive evidence compelling
 Conclusion: 
o Productivity, in the form of automation, “caused” the relative (and 
absolute) decline in manufacturing employment
o The decline was inevitable
Conclusion often repeated as fact in mainstream 
media
“From an economic perspective . . . there can be no 
revival of American manufacturing, because there 
has been no collapse. Because of automation, there 
are far fewer jobs in factories. But the value of stuff 
made in America reached a record high in the first 
quarter of 2016, even after adjusting for inflation.” 
Binyamin Appelbaum, New York Times, 2016 
Alternate (correct) reconciliation: Measurement issue
 Manufacturing’s falling relative prices, robust output 
growth, and extraordinary productivity growth driven by 
one industry: computer and electronics products
 Computer industry accounts for less than 15% of 
manufacturing GDP 
 Outsized effect reflects statistical adjustment of 
computers and semiconductor price deflators for 
improvements in product quality
 Extraordinary productivity growth in computer 
industry—by extension in manufacturing—reflects 
product improvements, not automation
 Skews statistics, gives misleading impression about 
sector’s health
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Price deflators, private industries and manufacturing, 
1987=100 
Private ind, as published Mfg, as published
Excluding computer 
industry, manufacturing 
prices are not falling 
relative to private sector 
prices.
Manufacturing prices not falling relative to other 
industry prices outside computer industry
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Price Deflator Indices, Private Industry and 
Manufacturing Omitting Computer Industry, Computer 
Industry
Private industry, w/o computers Mfg, w/o computers Computer industry
Price deflators for 
computer industry 
rapidly declining after 
1960s, reflects quality 
adjustment for product 
improvements
Manufacturing real GDP growth much slower without 
computer industry
• Mfg GDP growth 
45% of  private 
sector GDP 
growth, 1979-2000
• 12%, 2000-2016
• Manufacturing 
output less in 2016 
than in 2007.
 Despite driving apparent robust manufacturing growth, 
domestic manufacturing of computer & electronic 
products losing competitiveness  Houseman, Bartik, Sturgeon (2016)
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Real GDP: Private Industry and Manufacturing 
less Computers, Computer Industry, 1977=100
Private industries, less computers Manufacturing, less computers Computers
Growth in domestic consumption for manufactured 
products has been greater than for services recently
 Since 2000, domestic real consumption of manufactured products 
(excluding computer and electronics products) grown at 2.8% per 
year, compared to 1.8% for services
o Growth in domestic consumption of furniture especially high at 3.5%
o Consistent with flood of cheap imported products increasing 
consumer demand
Manufacturing productivity growth not higher, or only 
somewhat higher, than that in private industry
 Without computer and electronics products industry, labor and 
multifactor productivity has been approximately the same in 
manufacturing and private industry, 1987-2011 (Baily and Bosworth 
2015)
 If productivity growth the same, it can account for NONE of the 
decline in manufacturing’s employment share
o Lower output growth accounts for all of the decline in 
manufacturing’s employment share
 Alternate calculations, using historical employment data back to 
1977:
o Slower output growth “accounts for” the majority of the decline in 
manufacturing’s employment share historically.  
 No prima facie case that productivity growth caused relative 
employment declines in manufacturing
Interpreting productivity growth
 Productivity growth ≠ automation
 Measured productivity growth may be capturing many things 
besides automation:
o Product improvements, as in computers and semiconductors
o Changes in the composition of products produced: Productivity 
growth may be the consequence of trade competition if labor 
intensive processes move overseas.
o Global supply chains and “slicing up of the value chain” may alter the 
stages of production done in U.S., raising productivity growth
o International competition may spur automation
 Productivity growth does not, per se, cause employment declines
o Strong argument that decline in manufacturing employment inevitable 
based on misreading of accounting identities
o Accounting identities and other descriptive evidence cannot be 
interpreted as causal
Research finds large effects of international trade on 
manufacturing job losses in 2000s
 Exchange rates, industry subsidies and taxes, tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers affect relative competitiveness of manufacturing in U.S.
 Globalization may reduce domestic manufacturing output growth 
by:
o Increasing growth in real imports
o Slowing growth in real exports—companies choose to relocate or 
expand overseas
 No study captures all aspects globalization and its effects on 
manufacturing employment—but collectively research findings 
point to large adverse effects, operating through various 
mechanisms.
Selected study findings of effects of trade on 
manufacturing employment losses in 2000s
 Imports from China can account for ≈ 25% of decline in 
manufacturing employment (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2013)
 Changes in trade policy after 2000 caused increase in imports from 
China (both from Chinese exporters and U.S. based importers) and 
significant decline in manufacturing employment (Pierce and Schott 
2016)
o Shift to less labor-intensive also led to significant employment 
declines
 Imports from China have also depressed investment, R&D, and 
sales in domestic manufacturing (Autor et al. 2017, Pierce and 
Schott 2017)
 Appreciation of dollar and higher labor costs can explain more than 
two-thirds of decline in manufacturing employment in early 2000s, 
as well as declines in 1980s (Campbell 2016).  
Research fails to find a causal link between technology 
and collapse of manufacturing employment in 2000s
 Little evidence that IT investment and investment in advanced 
manufacturing technologies increased labor productivity, especially 
after 1990s (Acemouglu et al. 2014) 
o Where correlations exist, associated with declines in output and even 
faster declines in employment (suggesting something besides 
technological displacement going on).
 Industries experiencing increased competition from China had 
employment declines; industries susceptible to computerization of 
routine tasks experienced polarization of occupations, NOT 
employment declines (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2015)
 Industrial robots have potential to displace many workers in future, 
but effect on manufacturing employment to date minimal 
(Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017)
 Rise of markups since 1980s and offshoring of labor intensive 
processes (not capital investment) account for rise of capital share 
(De Loecker and Eeckhout 2017; Elsby, Hobijn, Sahin 2013)
o inconsistent with large technology shock causing employment 
declines, rise in capital share 
Why manufacturing matters
 Number of workers engaged in manufacturing still large:
o About half of workers needed in manufacturing now employed 
outside the sector
 Large spillover effects on local and national economy
 Plant closures have large adverse and lasting effects on workers and 
communities:
o Dislocated workers experience large, persistent earnings losses
o Large adverse shocks can send regional economies into downward 
spiral, depress regions for decades (Dix-Carnairo and Kovak, 2017)
o Collapse of manufacturing employment contributed to decline in 
employment rates, especially among less-educated men and women 
(Charles et al. 2016, Autor et al. 2016) 
 Loss of production leads to loss of R&D: 
o Conclusion of MIT Production in the Innovation Economy project 
(Berger 2013)
